TY - JOUR
T1 - Sartre’s Dialectical Methodology
AU - Sherman, David
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2016 The British Society for Phenomenology.
PY - 2017/4/3
Y1 - 2017/4/3
N2 - Sartre’s intention in the Critique of Dialectical Reason is to establish the heuristic value of the dialectical method when applied to the social sciences. Toward this end, he furnishes an account of how, on the basis of natural needs, rational choices, burgeoning social ensembles, natural and social contingencies and unintended consequences, human beings make their history. I shall argue that his dialectical method, especially when modified, opens up interesting possibilities for clarifying the two most important and enduring meta-issues in the philosophy of social science: (1) whether social phenomena should be explained in terms of the beliefs, desires and actions of individuals or the rules and practices of social institutions (“Methodological Individualism” or “Methodological Holism”) and (2) whether social phenomena should be explained in terms of causes, as in the natural sciences, or in terms of what they mean in their social contexts, as in hermeneutics and other interpretive approaches (“Explanation” or “Understanding”).
AB - Sartre’s intention in the Critique of Dialectical Reason is to establish the heuristic value of the dialectical method when applied to the social sciences. Toward this end, he furnishes an account of how, on the basis of natural needs, rational choices, burgeoning social ensembles, natural and social contingencies and unintended consequences, human beings make their history. I shall argue that his dialectical method, especially when modified, opens up interesting possibilities for clarifying the two most important and enduring meta-issues in the philosophy of social science: (1) whether social phenomena should be explained in terms of the beliefs, desires and actions of individuals or the rules and practices of social institutions (“Methodological Individualism” or “Methodological Holism”) and (2) whether social phenomena should be explained in terms of causes, as in the natural sciences, or in terms of what they mean in their social contexts, as in hermeneutics and other interpretive approaches (“Explanation” or “Understanding”).
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85007483031&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1080/00071773.2016.1266797
DO - 10.1080/00071773.2016.1266797
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85007483031
SN - 0007-1773
VL - 48
SP - 116
EP - 134
JO - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology
JF - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology
IS - 2
ER -